The Rag Blog

In 2002, Donald Rumsfeld famously called the detainees at Guantánamo “the worst of the worst.” General Richard B. Myers, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned they were “very dangerous people who would gnaw hydraulic lines in the back of a C-17 to bring it down.” These claims were designed to justify locking up hundreds of men and boys for years in small cages like animals.

George W. Bush lost no time establishing military commissions to try the very “worst of the worst” for war crimes. But four and a half years later, the Supreme Court decided in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that those commissions violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions. So Bush dusted them off, made a few changes, and rammed his new improved military commissions through the Republican Congress last fall.

Only three detainees have been brought before the new commissions. One would expect the people Bush & Co. singled out for war crimes prosecutions would be high-level al-Qaeda leaders. But they weren’t. The first was David Hicks, who was evidently not so dangerous. The U.S. military made a deal that garnered Hicks a misdemeanor sentence and sent him back to Australia.

Salem Ahmed Hamdan, a Yemeni who used to be Osama bin Laden’s chauffeur, was the second. Hamdan, whose case had been overturned by the Supreme Court, was finally brought before a military commission Monday for arraignment on charges of conspiracy and material support for terrorism.

The third defendant was Omar Khadr, a Canadian citizen, who appeared for arraignment the same day as Hamdan. Khadr was 15 years old when he arrived at Guantánamo. He faced charges of conspiracy, murder, attempted murder, spying, and supporting terrorism.

On Monday, much to Bush’s dismay, two different military judges dismissed both Hamdan’s and Khadr’s cases on procedural grounds.

The Military Commissions Act that Congress passed last year says the military commissions have jurisdiction to try offenses committed by alien unlawful enemy combatants. Unlawful enemy combatants are defined as (1) people who have engaged in hostilities or purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its allies; or (2) people who have been determined to be unlawful enemy combatants by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) or another competent tribunal. The Act says that a determination of unlawful enemy combatant status by a CSRT or another competent tribunal is dispositive.

But there are no “unlawful” enemy combatants at Guantánamo. There are only men who have been determined to be “enemy combatants” by the CSRTs. The Act declares that military commissions “shall not have jurisdiction over lawful enemy combatants.” In its haste to launch post-Hamdan military commissions, Bush’s legal eagles didn’t notice this discrepancy. That is why the charges were dismissed.

The Bush administration may try to fix the procedural problem and retry Khadr and Hamdan. But regardless of whether Guantánamo detainees are lawful or unlawful enemy combatants, the Bush administration’s treatment of them violates the Geneva Conventions. Lawful enemy combatants are protected against inhumane treatment by the Third Geneva Convention on prisoners of war. Unlawful enemy combatants are protected against inhumane treatment by Common Article Three.

Omar Khadr was captured in Afghanistan and brought to Guantánamo when he was 15 years old. In both places, he has been repeatedly tortured and subjected to inhumane treatment. At Bagram Air Base, Khadr was denied pain medication for his serious head and eye shrapnel wounds. At Guantánamo, his hands and feet were shackled together, he was bolted to the floor and left there for hours at a time. After he urinated on himself and on the floor, U.S. military guards mopped the floor with his skinny little body. Khadr was beaten in the head, dogs lunged at him, and he was threatened with rape and the removal of his body parts.

Khadr cried frequently. He has nightmares, sweats and hyperventilates, and is hypervigilant, hearing sounds that he can’t identify. When Khadr’s lawyer saw him for the first time in 2004, he thought, “He’s just a little kid.”

Why was Khadr treated this way? He comes from a family allegedly active in al-Qaeda. His charges stem from an incident where the U.S. sent Afghans into a compound where Khadr and others were located. The people inside the compound killed the Afghans and began firing at the U.S. soldiers. The Americans dropped two 500-pound bombs on the compound, killing everyone inside except Khadr. After Khadr threw a hand grenade which killed an American, the soldiers shot Khadr, blinding and seriously wounding him. Khadr begged them in English to finish him off. He was then taken to Baghram and later to Guantánamo.

According to Donald Rehkopf, Jr., co-chair of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers Military Law Committee, “The government has steadfastly refused to allow hearings on this alleged [unlawful enemy combatant] status because there are so many prisoners at GTMO that were not even combatants, much less ‘unlawful’ ones. Khadr is in an unusual situation because he has a viable ‘self-defense’ claim – we attacked the compound that he and his family were living in, and the fact that he was only 15 at the time.”

If Khadr were a U.S. citizen, he would not even be subject to trial by court-martial because of his age. When the Supreme Court ruled in 2005 that children under 18 at the time of their crimes could not be executed, it said that youths display a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility” that “often results in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.” A juvenile, the Court found, is more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and his character is not as well-formed as that of an adult. “From a moral standpoint,” Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority, “it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.” The Bush administration’s treatment of Omar Khadr flies in the face of the Court’s reasoning.

The United States may be able to retry Khadr and Hamdan. They have a few days to file an appeal. But the Court of Military Commissions Review hasn’t even been established yet, so it’s unclear where the appeals would be brought.

The Military Commissions Act, which denies basic due process protections, including the right to habeas corpus, is a disgrace. But an even bigger disgrace is the concentration camp the United States maintains at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The Act should be repealed and the Guantánamo prison should be shut down immediately.

Over the past few weeks, American planes have landed at Beirut airport with arms and ammunition for the Lebanese army. The army’s battle with a small Islamist militia in a Palestinian refugee camp in north Lebanon has galvanised the Bush administration to support a middle east army in crisis. But what does Lebanon have to do with the US and its national interests?

Even if Lebanon connects, however tangentially, with the twin western concerns of Israel and oil, there is no strong case for America to involve itself in Lebanese affairs. As Edward Luttwak said—arguing in the May 2007 issue of Prospect that the west should start to take the middle east less seriously — “Strategically, the Arab-Israeli conflict has been almost irrelevant since the end of the cold war… And global dependence on middle eastern oil is declining.”

I am not denigrating the seriousness of the violence in Lebanon and its potential to push the country back into civil war. Nor do I lack passion for Lebanon, my home for many years and birthplace of my maternal grandparents. Its politics fascinate me, in part because the country governs itself much as it did in Ottoman times—with tribal leaders seeking outside protection, allying with one another and, occasionally, battling old friends. Lebanon, like the rest of the region, masked its conflicts in the garb of the cold war when it needed to, and it is adept at portraying itself as a battleground between secularism and Islamic fundamentalism now. The game, however, has always been local—which pasha or bey will dominate which hilltop, which tribe will take the larger share of the trade in banking or hashish, which local commander will pledge his men to which regional overlord. Lebanon happens to be significant to me. But it is not important to the US.

Supporters of American intervention in Lebanon may contend that, without US military support, Syria will come to dominate the country. The Shia Hizbullah will gain the upper hand against the Sunnis, Druze and Christians. Israel might have to invade again. These outcomes are possible, perhaps probable, but, unless you are Lebanese, so what? America approved the Syrian interventions in Lebanon in 1976, 1986 and 1990; it may well approve the next.

The US need not play every political game on earth. Half a million American troops are losing a war in Iraq, the US is waging war in Afghanistan, and it has troops stationed in a majority of the world’s countries. It is taking part, covertly and overtly, in small wars in Colombia, the Philippines and a dozen other places. It provides training and materiel to governments around the globe, usually unelected, to keep the peasants down, drive them from the land, sustain local clients and ensure American business pride of place at trading tables everywhere.

Lebanon is one of the most telling examples of the futility of America’s global policies, and the hell of it is that America has been in Lebanon before. In 1982 and 1983, the US stationed marines in Beirut, ostensibly to protect the Palestinian refugee camps from further massacres of the type that Israel and its Lebanese Christian allies inflicted in September 1982. It also sent military advisers to train the Lebanese army, whose commanders understood American support to mean they could arrest, torture and otherwise dispose of their enemies. But the US could not hold the Lebanese army together, the Lebanese government’s opponents drove the marines out of the country in February 1984 and for seven years American citizens could not walk the streets of Beirut without being kidnapped or killed. President Reagan once said that the future of the free world depended on the ability of the Lebanese army to hold out in the mountain village of Souk el-Gharb. Souk el-What? Despite US intervention, Souk el-Gharb fell. The US survived. And in 2007, whether the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp falls will not affect any American’s safety or livelihood.

Edward Luttwak’s otherwise snide and patronising critique of a region for which America has displayed an exaggerated imperial interest makes the valid observation that the middle east is not important enough to fight over. But Luttwak did not carry his argument to its obvious conclusion: if the mideast is no big deal, the US should cut all arms sales and military aid to the region. That means withdrawing from Iraq; closing bases in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain; ending arms deliveries to the reactionary monarchy in Saudi Arabia; and cutting aid to Israel.

Why should the American taxpayer give $5.5bn in total aid to Israel every year so that it can dominate a region of diminished strategic value? If the US doesn’t give Israel cluster bombs, Israel won’t drop millions of them all over south Lebanon. And why send arms to Saudi Arabia, a country that has never fought a war? The Congressional Research Service reported this year that the US had delivered $17.9bn in weapons to Saudi Arabia between 1998 and 2005. If the US didn’t give Saudi Arabia the advanced tanks and jet fighters that it can never deploy, there would be no danger of the weapons finding their way into the hands of Islamist militants. The US is arming Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and the Fateh portion of the Palestine authority. In whose interest is that? The US should introduce a resolution in the UN security council to enforce an arms embargo on all states in the middle east — at least until they resolve their disputes without benefit of the American firepower that makes their wars all the more destructive. That would make the region — and the rest of us — safer.

BAGHDAD – Inside the bloody kaleidoscope of Iraq, the list of enemies and allies is long, shifting and motley, running from “revolution brigades” and Baathists to Salafists, secularists and suicidal zealots, but only one group routinely is tagged “Public Enemy No. 1” by the Americans.

Nine out of 10 times, when it names a foe it faces, the U.S. military names al-Qaida in Iraq. President Bush says Iraq may become an al-Qaida base to “launch new attacks on America.” The U.S. ambassador here suggested this week al-Qaida might “assume real power” in Iraq if U.S. forces withdraw.

Critics say this is overblown and possibly a diversion.

“Such speculation is unrealistic,” Amer Hassan al-Fayadh, Baghdad University political science dean, said of the U.S. statements.

Iraq’s Shiite Muslim majority, strong Kurdish ethnic minority, secularist Sunni Muslims and others would suppress any real power bid by the fringe Sunni religious extremists of al-Qaida, al-Fayadh said.

“The people who are fighting al-Qaida in Iraq are the Sunnis themselves,” he said.

Since Iraqis rose up against the U.S. occupation in 2003, the insurgency has spawned a long roster of militant groups – the 1920 Revolution Brigades, Islamic Army in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunnah and the Mujahedeen Army, among others – drawing on loyalists of the ousted, Sunni-dominated Baathist regime, other nationalists, Islamists, tribal groups and militant Shiites.

Some 30 groups now claim responsibility for attacks against U.S. and government targets, said Ben Venzke, head of the Virginia-based IntelCenter, which tracks such statements for the U.S. government.

Despite this proliferation of enemies, the U.S. command’s news releases on American operations focus overwhelmingly on al-Qaida.

When George Bush announced that he favored keeping troops in Iraq for decades, the media apparently didn’t think the opinion of Iraqis mattered.

On May 25, George Bush signed a defense bill that outlawed the construction of (new) permanent bases in Iraq. But only five days later, White House press flack Tony Snow told reporters that the president is now modeling the future of his bloody signature project on the half-century U.S. experience in South Korea, with troops in Iraq for the long haul to provide, in Snow’s words, “a security presence” and to serve as a “force of stability.”

Asked how long that commitment would last, Snow said, “A long time.” Tens of thousands of U.S. troops have been stationed in South Korea since 1953 — for 54 years.

In the days that followed Snow’s revelation, senior Pentagon officials weighed in with their support for applying the Korea Model to Iraq: keeping a few divisions of U.S. troops in-country for the next five decades or so sounded just about right to them.

It was such a naked acknowledgement of America’s long-term designs on carving out a strategic foothold in the region that even the milquetoast American press had to acknowledge it, and most of the major news outlets ran stories in the last week that at least touched on the Iraq hawks’ shiny new analogy.

But we noticed something fascinating when reading those articles: In story after story, U.S. reporters were quick to seek comment from White House officials and to “balance” those comments with quotes from congressional Democrats and from analysts at various D.C. think tanks who are critical of the administration. They talked to foreign policy and military experts, historians and even Korea experts.

But here’s the rub: None of the reporters we read bothered to pick up a phone and call Baghdad to get reactions from, well, actual Iraqis.

So we did — we called Iraqi lawmakers from different parties representing the country’s different ethnic and sectarian groups, and found that, without exception, just hearing that there were official whispers in Washington about plans for a decades-long U.S. troop presence in their country shocked and awed them, and not in a good way.

But it didn’t only inflame the Iraqi nationalists with whom we spoke — politicians who have long opposed the occupation — it also absolutely incensed those officials who have been among the coalition’s most vocal supporters. Even those who approve of George Bush’s Middle East adventurism were infuriated by the idea and insulted that the administration would make the statement publicly.

But that was one viewpoint that didn’t find its way into any of the stories we read. Which leads to a question: What would the reporting out of Iraq look like if all reporters embraced the simple idea that Iraqis’ views on the future of their country are worth a few column inches or a couple of seconds on American television screens?

The New York Times’ David Sanger, for example, wrote an analysis in which he quoted Tony Snow, Defense Secretary Robert Gates — Gates said, “The idea is more a model of a mutually agreed arrangement whereby we have a long and enduring presence but under the consent of both parties” — and a few anonymous “administration officials and top military leaders,” all of whom favored the idea.

Editor’s Note: Ian Pinklus reflects on how the ideology of individualism has trumpeted and triumphed over almost all individuals living under monoply capitalism’s “free market” economy based on the natural need to acquire maximum profit for the fewer and fewer owners of production.

Individualism — my individual needs and desires are greater than social needs and wishes — instructs us to accept as “natural” that there will always be winners and losers. I believe that imposed economic competition presents all of us with the need to face moral dilemmas in all aspects of life. Therefore, we anti-capitalists (including socialists, communists, anarchists, autonoms and any other collective approach to society) must find ways of communicating with our fellows with moral arguments aimed at destabilising individualism and replacing it with collective moral agendas. So, our fight must not rest only on economic incentives–more wage per hour of labour imput — but more on how can we best live with one another. The messages of idealists and materialists — such as Jesus and Ghandi, Marx and Plekanov, Lenin-Stalin-Trotsky, Che, Castro and Chavez–should be interwoven in our struggles. And we need to see one another (all of us anti-capitalists, including those with whom we are stragetically or tactically in disagreement) as brothers and sisters in the global struggle to create a world based on justice, equality and peace. Ron Ridenour, columnist.

Not long ago, a correspondent to the Morning Star letters column suggested that Tesco be nationalised.

Strictly speaking, what was proposed was that this should become a plank of policy for the left. I suspect that the suggestion may have been made a little tongue in cheek. All the same, it brought to mind some interesting, as well as some rather depressing, possibilities.

First, it would not make sense to campaign solely for the nationalisation of Tesco. We would not want the other “one-stop grocery” giants, such as Sainsbury’s, Asda and Morrison to feel left out.

Anyway, partial nationalisation of the industry would miss the point. The ultimate objective is common ownership of the means of production. Nationalisation of one industry, let alone just part of one industry, is no more than a stepping stone.

But let us be realistic. In the present economic climate, the proposal to nationalise almost any industry would be met with derision and ridicule from the political establishment.

We can more or less be certain that 99 per cent of economists would be aghast at any such proposal. They would lead the opposition to it.

We know that they would argue that nationalisation would harm the industry or industries concerned. They would argue that enterprises such as Tesco could never operate as “efficiently” under public ownership as under private ownership. They would cry that nationalisation would be an economic disaster.

What they are argue is that enterprises in the private sector are more motivated because they need to make a profit.

From the top down, from directors, through the managerial strata to the shop floor, the profit motive drives what they would term “efficiency.” It seeks out waste and eliminates it. It finds innovation and rewards it.

State-owned and run enterprises invariably provide both managers and workers with greater job security. Failure to turn a profit does not immediately threaten the workforce with redundancies and unemployment. The profit motive is not uppermost, so individual performance is not prey to the firm’s balance sheet.

Since the principal test of “efficiency” in a capitalist economy is the size of profits, the claim that private-sector business are more “efficient” becomes self-justifying.

The track record of many, though by no means all, privatised industries suggests that they are more innovative, more cost conscious, more profit-oriented and, overall, more profitable than their nationalised predecessors.

But the reason does not lie simplistically in the fact that they are owned privately rather than by the state. It lies in the ideological framework within which they operate.

Capitalism uses economic incentives to cajole and motivate economic agents, whether they be directors, managers or workers. The vast majority of people who go to work – indeed, the vast majority of the population, accept these economic or financial incentives, not just as justifiable but as “natural,” part of the way that the world is.

They have been brought up to accept such values and norms by their families, by their schools, their religions and their televisions.

Almost all of us, even if we intellectually reject these values, cannot but help live some significant part of our lives governed by them.

Such ideological values are not restricted to economic concerns. These are just a part of a whole ideological range of value systems that extend into all quarters of our individual and social lives.

Underpinning this ideological framework are some very basic values. One of the most significant of these is the principle of individualism.

‘The main test of efficiency in a capitalist economy is the size of profits, so it’s not surprising that the private sector is “efficient”.’

The primacy of the individual as the basic unit of capitalist society is well established. It did not need Margaret Thatcher to pronounce that there was no such thing as society, only individuals. In the 19th century, utilitarian philosophy and Darwinian science had already established individualism as a foundation stone of bourgeois thinking.

The influence of this philosophical cornerstone extends to all aspects of our lives. In no aspect is it more apparent than in our economic behaviour.

We are a workforce trapped in an economic system not of our making. Our need to provide for ourselves and our family forces us into competitive behaviour where our success is at the expense of someone else’s failure. The ramifications of this are manifest to all of us on a daily basis. As socialists, this confronts us with moral dilemmas each day.

So, whether we acquiesce to the values of the marketplace willingly, unwillingly or unconsciously, we comply with its demands.

Hence, it is not surprising that the stricter, profit-driven financial incentives of the private sector are likely to prove more effective in driving the workforce towards the creation of higher profits.

We can take some comfort from the fact that, so far at least, bourgeois capitalism has yet to successfully privatise health, education and social services. But the Labour government will do its best.

Recently, it proposed 17 licensed casinos. Not for a microsecond did it contemplate the possibility that they might be state owned and run.

In France there are no betting shops, no private-sector betting, there is only the PMU. This is a state-owned and run system of pool betting. In Britain, we call it the Tote.

Is this just a hangover from when France was socialist? Not at all. Australia, whose socialist credentials are less than those of France, also has a state-owned Tote that has a monopoly everywhere except the racetracks. And, in Hong Kong, that showcase of capitalist success, there is a complete Tote monopoly.

In Britain, the state-owned Tote has to compete with the private sector. The Labour government is in the process of privatising it.

The proposal to nationalise Tesco is a sharp reminder of how capitalism is constantly undergoing change.

Even 20 years ago, Tesco would not be anywhere near to the top of the nationalisation “must-do list.”

Today, it is one of the most obvious targets. Tesco has grown fast and big. Its expansion is a fascinating illustration of a growing trend in modern capitalism for industries to become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands.

Monopoly capitalism continues to grow and restructure the economic landscape. This is largely the consequence of technological advances and it is unlikely to stop.

Cubans say they offer health care to the world’s poor because they have big hearts. But what do they get in return?

They live longer than almost anyone in Latin America. Far fewer babies die. Almost everyone has been vaccinated, and such scourges of the poor as parasites, TB, malaria, even HIV/AIDS are rare or non-existent. Anyone can see a doctor, at low cost, right in the neighborhood.

The Cuban health care system is producing a population that is as healthy as those of the world’s wealthiest countries at a fraction of the cost. And now Cuba has begun exporting its system to under-served communities around the world—including the United States.

The story of Cuba’s health care ambitions is largely hidden from the people of the United States, where politics left over from the Cold War maintain an embargo on information and understanding. But it is increasingly well-known in the poorest communities of Latin America, the Caribbean, and parts of Africa where Cuban and Cuban-trained doctors are practicing.

In the words of Dr. Paul Farmer, Cuba is showing that “you can introduce the notion of a right to health care and wipe out the diseases of poverty.”

Health Care for All Cubans

Many elements of the health care system Cuba is exporting around the world are common-sense practices. Everyone has access to doctors, nurses, specialists, and medications. There is a doctor and nurse team in every neighborhood, although somewhat fewer now, with 29,000 medical professionals serving out of the country—a fact that is causing some complaints. If someone doesn’t like their neighborhood doctor, they can choose another one.

House calls are routine, in part because it’s the responsibility of the doctor and nurse team to understand you and your health issues in the context of your family, home, and neighborhood. This is key to the system. By catching diseases and health hazards before they get big, the Cuban medical system can spend a little on prevention rather than a lot later on to cure diseases, stop outbreaks, or cope with long-term disabilities. When a health hazard like dengue fever or malaria is identified, there is a coordinated nationwide effort to eradicate it. Cubans no longer suffer from diphtheria, rubella, polio, or measles and they have the lowest AIDS rate in the Americas, and the highest rate of treatment and control of hypertension.

For health issues beyond the capacity of the neighborhood doctor, polyclinics provide specialists, outpatient operations, physical therapy, rehabilitation, and labs. Those who need inpatient treatment can go to hospitals; at the end of their stay, their neighborhood medical team helps make the transition home. Doctors at all levels are trained to administer acupuncture, herbal cures, or other complementary practices that Cuban labs have found effective. And Cuban researchers develop their own vaccinations and treatments when medications aren’t available due to the blockade, or when they don’t exist.

Exporting Health Care

For decades, Cuba has sent doctors abroad and trained international students at its medical schools. But things ramped up beginning in 1998 when Hurricanes George and Mitch hammered Central America and the Caribbean. As they had often done, Cuban doctors rushed to the disaster zone to help those suffering the aftermath. But when it was time to go home, it was clear to the Cuban teams that the medical needs extended far beyond emergency care. So Cuba made a commitment to post doctors in several of these countries and to train local people in medicine so they could pick up where the Cuban doctors left off. ELAM, the Havana-based Latin American School of Medicine, was born, and with it the offer of 10,000 scholarships for free medical training.

Today the program has grown to 22,000 students from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and the United States who attend ELAM and 28 other medical schools across Cuba. The students represent dozens of ethnic groups, 51 percent are women, and they come from more than 30 countries. What they have in common is that they would otherwise be unable to get a medical education. When a slum dweller in Port au Prince, a young indigenous person from Bolivia, the son or daughter of a farmer in Honduras, or a street vendor in the Gambia wants to become a doctor, they turn to Cuba. In some cases, Venezuela pays the bill. But most of the time, Cuba covers tuition, living expenses, books, and medical care. In return, the students agree that, upon completion of their studies, they will return to their own under-served communities to practice medicine.

The curriculum at ELAM begins, for most students, with up to a year of “bridging” courses, allowing them to catch up on basic math, science, and Spanish skills. The students are treated for the ailments many bring with them.

At the end of their training, which can take up to eight years, most students return home for residencies. Although they all make a verbal commitment to serve the poor, a few students quietly admit that they don’t see this as a permanent commitment.

One challenge of the Cuban approach is making sure their investment in medical education benefits those who need it most. Doctors from poor areas routinely move to wealthier areas or out of the country altogether. Cuba trains doctors in an ethic of serving the poor. They learn to see medical care as a right, not as a commodity, and to see their own role as one of service. Stories of Cuban doctors who practice abroad suggest these lessons stick. They are known for taking money out of their own pockets to buy medicine for patients who can’t afford to fill a prescription, and for touching and even embracing patients.

Cuba plans with the help of Venezuela to take their medical training to a massive scale and graduate 100,000 doctors over the next 15 years, according to Dr. Juan Ceballos, advisor to the vice minister of public health. To do so, Cuba has been building new medical schools around the country and abroad, at a rapid clip.

Finally, the great American disconnect may be ending. Only four years after the invasion of Iraq, the crucial facts-on-the-ground might finally be coming into sight in this country — not the carnage or the mayhem; not the suicide car bombs or the chlorine truck bombs; not the massive flight of middle-class professionals, the assassination campaign against academics, or the collapse of the best health-care service in the region; not the spiking American and Iraqi casualties, the lack of electricity, the growth of Shia militias, the crumbling of the “coalition of the willing,” or the uprooting of 15% or more of Iraq’s population; not even the sharp increase in fundamentalism and extremism, the rise of al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia, the swelling of sectarian killings, or the inability of the Iraqi government to get oil out of the ground or an oil law, designed in Washington and meant to turn the clock back decades in the Middle East, passed inside Baghdad’s fortified Green Zone — no, none of that. What’s finally coming into view is just what George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, the top officials of their administration, the civilian leadership at the Pentagon, and their neocon followers had in mind when they invaded and occupied Iraq in 2003.

But let me approach this issue another way. For the last week, news jockeys have been plunged into a debate about the “Korea model,” which, according to the New York Times and other media outlets, the President is suddenly considering as the model for Iraq. (“Mr. Bush has told recent visitors to the White House that he was seeking a model similar to the American presence in South Korea.”) You know, a limited number of major American bases tucked away out of urban areas; a limited number of American troops (say, 30,000-40,000), largely confined to those bases but ready to strike at any moment; a friendly government in Baghdad; and (as in South Korea where our troops have been for six decades) maybe another half century-plus of quiet garrisoning. In other words, this is the time equivalent of a geographic “over the horizon redeployment” of American troops. In this case, “over the horizon” would mean through 2057 and beyond.

This, we are now told, is a new stage in administration thinking. White House spokesman Tony Snow seconded the “Korea model” (“You have the United States there in what has been described as an over-the-horizon support role… — as we have in South Korea, where for many years there have been American forces stationed there as a way of maintaining stability and assurance on the part of the South Korean people against a North Korean neighbor that is a menace…”); Defense Secretary Robert Gates threw his weight behind it as a way of reassuring Iraqis that the U.S. “will not withdraw from Iraq as it did from Vietnam, ‘lock, stock and barrel,'” as did “surge plan” second-in-command in Baghdad, Lt. General Ray Odierno. (“Q Do you agree that we will likely have a South Korean-style force there for years to come? GEN. ODIERNO: Well, I think that’s a strategic decision, and I think that’s between us and — the government of the United States and the government of Iraq. I think it’s a great idea.”)

David Sanger of the New York Times recently summed up this “new” thinking in the following fashion:

“Administration officials and top military leaders declined to talk on the record about their long-term plans in Iraq. But when speaking on a not-for-attribution basis, they describe a fairly detailed concept. It calls for maintaining three or four major bases in the country, all well outside of the crowded urban areas where casualties have soared. They would include the base at Al Asad in Anbar Province, Balad Air Base about 50 miles north of Baghdad, and Tallil Air Base in the south.”

Critics — left, right, and center — promptly attacked the relevance of the South Korean analogy for all the obvious historical reasons. Time headlined its piece: “Why Iraq Isn’t Korea”; Fred Kaplan of Slate waded in this way, “In other words, in no meaningful way are these two wars, or these two countries, remotely similar. In no way does one experience, or set of lessons, shed light on the other. In Iraq, no border divides friend from foe; no clear concept defines who is friend and foe. To say that Iraq might follow ‘a Korean model’ — if the word model means anything — is absurd.” At his Informed Comment website, Juan Cole wrote, “So what confuses me is the terms of the comparison. Who is playing the role of the Communists and of North Korea?” Inter Press’s Jim Lobe quoted retired Lieutenant-General Donald Kerrick, a former US deputy national security adviser who served two tours of duty in South Korea this way: “[The analogy] is either a gross oversimplification to try to reassure people [the Bush administration] has a long-term plan, or it’s just silly.”

None of these critiques are anything but on target. Nonetheless, the “Korea model” should not be dismissed simply for gross historical inaccuracy. There’s a far more important reason to attend to it, confirmed by four years of facts-on-the-ground in Iraq — and by a little history that, it seems, no one, not even the New York Times which helped record it, remembers.

How Enduring Are Those “Enduring Camps”?

At the moment, the Korea model is being presented as breaking news, as the next step in the Bush administration’s desperately evolving thinking as its “surge plan” surges into disaster. However, the most basic fact of our present “Korea” moment is that this is the oldest news of all. As the Bush administration launched its invasion in March 2003, it imagined itself entering a “South Korean” Iraq (though that analogy was never used). While Americans, including administration officials, would argue endlessly over whether we were in Tokyo or Berlin, 1945, Algeria of the 1950s, Vietnam of the 1960s and 70s, civil-war torn Beirut of the 1980s, or numerous other historically distant places, when it came to the facts on the ground, the administration’s actual planning remained obdurately in “South Korea.”

Amnesty International yesterday launched a scathing attack on the United States accusing it of trampling on human rights, and using the world as “a giant battlefield” in its “war on terror.”

The war in Iraq and the politics of fear being spread by the administration of US President George W. Bush around the globe were fuelling deep international divisions, the human rights group charged.

Washington was also guilty of “breathtakingly shameless” double speak, claiming to be promoting human rights while at the same time brazenly flouting international law, the London-based group charged in its 2007 annual report.

“Nothing more aptly portrayed the globalization of human rights violations than the US-led ‘war on terror’ and its programme of ‘extraordinary renditions’ which implicated governments in countries as far apart as Italy and Pakistan, Germany and Kenya,” said the group’s secretary general Irene Khan.

Last year, evidence revealed how “the US administration treated the world as one giant battlefield for its ‘war on terror’, kidnapping, arresting, arbitrarily detaining, torturing and transferring suspects from one secret prison to another across the world with impunity,” she added.

Hundreds of people have now been transferred by the US and its allies through these secret renditions to countries such as Syria, Jordan and Egypt.

Yet Washington remains deaf to pleas to shut down its remote military prison in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where many of these detainees have ended up, held without charge or trial, virtually incommunicado.

The “misguided military adventure in Iraq has taken a heavy toll on human rights and humanitarian law,” Khan said in Amnesty’s hard-hitting report.

If Iraq was to escape from the cycle of violence and bloodshed and avoid its “apocalyptic prognosis”, the Iraqi government and the US-led coalition had to set clear human rights benchmarks such as disarming the militia and reforming the police.

The international community, led by the US, had also squandered the opportunity to build an effective state based on human rights and the rule of law in Afghanistan, the group said.

And Amnesty berated the US administration for its “continued failure to hold senior government officials accountable for torture and other ill-treatment of ‘war on terror’ detainees despite evidence that abuses had been systematic.”

The US “is unrepentant about the global web of abuse it has spun in the name of counter-terrorism,” Khan wrote.

“It is oblivious to the distress of thousands of detainees and their families, the damage to the rule of international law and human rights and the destruction of its own moral authority, which has plummeted to an all-time low.”

While most observers are focused on the U.S. Congress as it continues to issue new rubber stamps to legitimize Bush’s permanent designs on Iraq, nationalists in the Iraqi parliament — now representing a majority of the body — continue to make progress toward bringing an end to their country’s occupation.

06/05/07 “AlterNet” — – The parliament today passed a binding resolution that will guarantee lawmakers an opportunity to block the extension of the U.N. mandate under which coalition troops now remain in Iraq when it comes up for renewal in December. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, whose cabinet is dominated by Iraqi separatists, may veto the measure.

The law requires the parliament’s approval of any future extensions of the mandate, which have previously been made by Iraq’s prime minister. It is an enormous development; lawmakers reached in Baghdad today said that they do in fact plan on blocking the extension of the coalition’s mandate when it comes up for renewal six months from now.

Reached today by phone in Baghdad, Nassar al Rubaie, the head of Al-Sadr bloc in Iraq’s Council of Representatives, said, “This new binding resolution will prevent the government from renewing the U.N. mandate without the parliament’s permission. They’ll need to come back to us by the end of the year, and we will definitely refuse to extend the U.N. mandate without conditions.” Rubaie added: “There will be no such a thing as a blank check for renewing the U.N. mandate anymore, any renewal will be attached to a timetable for a complete withdrawal.”

Without the cover of the U.N. mandate, the continued presence of coalition troops in Iraq would become, in law as in fact, an armed occupation, at which point it would no longer be politically tenable to support it. While polls show that most Iraqis consider U.S. forces to be occupiers rather than liberators or peacekeepers — 92 percent of respondents said as much in a 2004 survey by the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies — the U.N. mandate confers an aura of legitimacy on the continuing presence of foreign troops on Iraq’s streets, even four years after the fall of Saddam Hussein.

The resolution was initiated when a majority of Iraqi lawmakers signed a nonbinding legislative petition two weeks ago that called on the Iraqi government to demand a withdrawal of all foreign troops from the country.

While the issue of the Multinational Force’s (MNF) mandate has been virtually ignored by the American media, it has been a point of fierce contention in Baghdad. Last fall, just after the midterm elections in the United States, a coalition of Iraqi nationalists in the parliament tried to attach conditions to the mandate’s extension.

Iraqi lawmaker Jabir Habib (a Shia closely aligned with the al-Sadrist Movement) said in an interview last fall that the Iraqi Assembly had been poised to vote on the issue. “We spent the last months discussing the conditions we wanted to add to the mandate,” he said, “and the majority of the parliament decided on three major conditions. These conditions included pulling the coalition forces out of the cities and transferring responsibility for security to the Iraqi government, giving Iraqis the right to recruit, train, equip and command the Iraqi security forces, and requiring that the U.N. mandate expire and be reviewed every six months instead of every 12 months.”

Lawmakers said that while they likely had enough support to require a timetable for withdrawal as a condition of the mandate’s renewal last year, they were sidelined by al-Maliki when the prime minister sent a letter to the U.N. Security Council requesting an extension without consulting members of parliament. The move outraged lawmakers.

British Prime Minister Tony Blair had hoped that the G8 summit to be held in Heiligendamm, Germany, in June would provide a booster shot to the campaign hailing his supposed “legacy” before leaving office. He is to stand down as British prime minister in June.

Blair created an Africa Commission, and at the G8 summit held in Scotland in 2005, he won commitments from the assembled heads of state to increase aid and debt relief to some of the world’s poorest nations, which includes most sub-Saharan African countries.

The 2005 G8 summit was to be the culmination of a campaign by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and church groups to “Make Poverty History.” The campaign was fronted by the rock musicians Bob Geldof and Bono. Geldof’s assessment at the summit’s end was “10 out of 10” on aid relief and “8 out of 10” on debt relief. Blair declared that “great progress had been made.”

The communiqué issued by the G8 countries following the 2005 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland, stated, “There are now just ten years…to meet the goals agreed at the Millennium Summit in 2000. We should continue the G8 focus on Africa which is the only continent not on track to meet any of the goals of the Millennium Declaration by 2015.”

Many of the commitments have been reneged on or only partly met. The Guardian ran a report of the recent meeting of the so-called sherpas in Berlin—G8 officials who meet to prepare the summit proper. According to the 16 May Guardian article, British delegates who raised the question of aid budgets were met with little sympathy. The report quotes a Russian sherpa saying, “We only made those promises because we felt sorry for Tony Blair after the terrorist attacks on 7/7.” This was a reference to the bombings of a bus and tube trains in London, which had happened the previous day.

Bono has called for an emergency session to be held at the G8 summit to address the failure to meet the aid pledges. Speaking to the Guardian, he said, “It’s not just the credibility of the G8 that’s at stake. It’s the credibility of the largest non-violent protest in 30 years. Nobody wants to go back to what we saw in Genoa, but I do sense a real sense of jeopardy.”

Several reports recently published show the extent of the shortfall. One report is from the organisation established by Bono and Geldof, Debt AIDS Trade Africa, or DATA. The report’s aim is to put pressure on the G8. It states, “We hope that its findings will be taken to heart by Chancellor Merkel (of Germany) when she chairs the crucial session on Africa at the forthcoming G8 Summit in Heiligendamm.”

The DATA report monitors how the G8 countries are falling short of the commitments it promised to deliver—$25 billion a year in development aid by 2010. It notes:

“Collectively, the G8 are badly off track with their development assistance promise to Africa. In total G8 assistance to sub-Saharan Africa has increased by only $2.3 billion since 2004, when it should have increased by $5.4 billion over that period…. Concern is heightened by the small increases in aid that are in the pipeline for many G8 countries for 2007 and 2008. If G8 does not react quickly to get back on track with the needed scale-ups in assistance, the early successes…will be squandered….”

Regarding trade it adds, “the lack of global agreement and failure to focus on Africa mean that we can report no genuine progress…we must hold all G8 members accountable for this collective failing.”

A report issued by CONCORD, an umbrella organisation representing development NGOs based in Europe, analyses the aid programmes of European Union nations. The report is entitled “Hold the Applause.”

It states that the amounts promised by European governments do not match the amounts actually paid: “If European governments do not improve on current performance, poor countries will have received 50 billion Euros less from Europe by 2010 than…promised.” It accuses European government aid programmes of having “security, geopolitical alliances and domestic interests” as the main objectives.

The analysis shows 30 percent of the figure for aid claimed by European governments was not genuine aid. Amongst the methods used to inflate the aid figures is the inclusion of debt relief as aid. Another is to count cancellation of export credit debts as aid relief. As the report points out, export credits are used to support domestic companies seeking to do business in developing countries offering insurance against often very lucrative, if somewhat risky, ventures.